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CLAIMS AGAINST STATES
LESLIE L ANDERSON*

In 1924, commencing a leading series of articles on "Government
Liability in Tort,"1 Professor Edward M. Borchard referred to what
he called the "unexampled expansion of the police power in the
United States." He wrote of the increasing risks which individuals in
this country are left to bear from "defective, negligent, perverse or
erroneous administration" of the functions of government. If those
functions had increased at a considerable rate at the time of his
article, what would one say of their extent today? Even the leaders
of the New Deal discerned the risks to which increased governmental
activity subjected people, and they supported the proposal of the
American Bar Association that it was time for the Federal Govern2
ment to waive its immunity from suit.
States, on the contrary, moved with varying degrees of caution and
reluctance in their waiver of such immunity.3 In a larger sense, the
reasons for their waiver are the same as those which justify suit in
tort or contract against the United States. The suggestion that injury
or damage done by the government, whether by intention or through
negligence, in performing its functions for all the people should be
borne alone by the unfortunate one upon whom the harm has fallen4
is lacking in moral justification. There is no adequate reason on
principle why government, whether state or national, should not
be subject to suit on its contracts, whether express or implied, since
it could not be held liable in any event unless it had first authorized
the contract, purchase or expenditure.5
* Judge of United States District Court, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (192425); see also Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1,
757, 1039 (1926-27).
2. By pocket veto of President Coolidge, a general court of claims bill
passed by the 70th Congress had previously failed of enactment. The text of
the bill, H.R. 9285, may be found in 70 ConG. REc. 4836 (1929). Objection to
the bill at that time was generally to its administrative features. See McGuire,
Tort Claims Against The United States, 19 GEo. L.J. 133 (1931).
3. See Claims Against The State In Minnesota, 32 MINN. L. REv. 539 (1948).
For a valuable compilation of constitutional and statutory provisions of the
states see Couxcm or STATE GovmrnNms, SETTLEMENT or CLAIMs AGAINST
THE STATES (Still, 1950).

4. One can now sue the state in New York, where the court said, "the now
declared public policy of the State is that persons damaged by the torts of
those acting as its officers and employees need not contribute their losses to
the purposes of government." Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1937).
5. See Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287, 48 Sup.
Ct. 306, 72 L. Ed. 575 (1928); Leiter v. United States, 271 U.S. 204, 46 Sup. Ct.
477, 70 L. Ed. 906 (1926); Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 31 Sup. Ct. 85,
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Yet, there is some rationale in the reluctance of states to waive their
immunity from suit against them in tort, even though the Federal
Government has now done so under the Federal Tort Claims Act.6
States do not print money; some are more limited than others in
sources of taxation. A substantial portion of the increase in state
government activity is supported by federal aid which states supplement only up to a point; and a large portion of the increase has relation to desk work out of which personal torts are not so apt to occur.
Some states apparently feel that legislative committees can handle
their claims work adequately without taking their members too far
astray from the other problems of more general public import which
the legislature requires of them, whereas it was clear that many
members of Congress felt that they should be relieved of private
claims work so that they could give needed attention to the many
broader national and international problems. 7 Congress and the legislatures, moreover, have been zealous to keep control over the public
pursestrings, to protect the government against large unanticipated
claims and also not to release control over any function which historically has been conducted by the lawmakers. Press of business in
Congress compelled its release of such control as to most tort claims.
State legislatures deal with smaller governments and fewer problems,
and the urge to relinquish control has not been so pressing upon them.
Some states, moreover, have made provision to cover the eventuality of injury or damage arising out of certain types of activity.
Some conduct is apt to result in some amount of personal harm, so
that such a state would either permit itself to be sued in the event of
injury by this particular type of activity8 or require insurance on
54 L. Ed. 1055 (1910); Shipman v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 138, 147 (1883);
Curtis v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 144 (1866).
6. STAT. 842 (1946).

7. Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act:

Congressman Kefauver: "As it works, the departments actually pass on
these claims. As the chairman has said, Members of Congress, because of the
stress of other matters, simply do not have time to give them judicial consideration." Hearings before Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1945).
Senator Taylor: "[I]t is absolutely a very poor proposition to ask Senators
to spend their time pouring over these claims .. . you are absolutely at a
loss if you have not gone through the case yourself.
"So I have found that I had to go through them personally . . . when I
was supposed to be familiarizing myself with Dumbarton Oaks, Bretton Woods,

or Manpower, and many other things." Id. at 218-19.

8. E.g., Connecticut allows suit for injury or damage caused through negligence of a state employee operating a state-owned vehicle. CoN. GEN.
STAT. § 8297 (1949).
Minnesota has intermittently allowed groups of suits against the state for
damages caused by location, construction, reconstruction, improvement or
maintenance of the trunk highway system. Minn. Laws 1945, c. 6121 Minn.

Laws 1943, c. 662; Minn. Laws 1939, c. 420.

A South Carolina statute permits suit for personal injuries received from
highway department fault. Property damage claim may not exceed $1,500,
nor personal injury or death claim, $4,000. S.C. CODE § 33-229 (1952).
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persons contracting with the government with an agreement by the
insurance carrier not to raise the defense of the state's immunity.
Courts early developed their own method for getting around the
immunity in the case of municipal governments by conception of
a distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, the
former giving no basis for suit and the latter giving it.
Despite rationale to the contrary, and on a basis of good public
morals, any aggrieved person ought to have the same rights against
government, state or national, whether in contract or tort, at law
or in equity,9 as he has against any private person. There is no room
in a democracy for the theories of divine right of kings or that the
state is above the law. 0 Nor is there adequate reason for American
states to deny the protection of courts to their people in such cases
when small nations and some countries that are not even democracies
grant such rights."State ConstitutionalProvisions
Peculiarly enough, the constitutions of many states clearly indicate

that their framers expected that the legislatures would provide means
for court action against the states.12 Tennessee's constitution, for ex9. Legislatures themselves are free to consider equity aspects of claims
or to pay them if there are probable moral but no legal bases for them.
The Alabama Board of Adjustment may consider claims morally grounded
even though not enforceable in the courts. ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 344 (1940);
Lee v. Cunningham, 234 Ala. 639, 176 So. 477 (1937).
The Connecticut governor, upon recommendation of the attorney general,
may authorize compromise of a disputed claim by determining the amount
equitably due. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 103 (1949).
The Illinois Court of Claims may hear and determine tort claims where
the claimant, but for the immunity, would be entitled to redress against the
state "at law or in chancery." ILL. ANx. STAT. c. 37, § 439.8 (Supp. 1953).
An Indiana statute permits suit on a "money demand" arising "at law or in
equity, out of contract, express or implied." IND. STAT. AN. § 4-1501 (Burns
1933).
While West Virginia had a court of claims, its jurisdiction extended to
"Claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto
...
which the State as a sovereign commonwealth should in equity and good
conscience discharge and pay." W. VA. CODE Arx. § 1147(8) (1949), repealed,
W.10.
Va.Even
Laws 1953, c. 18.
the liberal Air. Justice Holmes wrote, "[A] sovereign is exempt
from suit ...

on the ...

ground that there can be no legal right as against

the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834 (1907).
See Claims against the State in Minnesota, 32 Am. L. REv. 539 (1948); note
1 supra (Borchard criticizes theories that "Feudal Lord cannot be sued in his
own court" and "the king can do no wrong").
11. See note 1 supra.
12. A~iz, CONST. Art. IV, pt. 2, § 18; CAL. CONST. Art. XX, § 6; DEL. CONST.
Art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 22; IDAHO CONST. Art. V, § 10; IND. CoNST.
Art. IV, § 24; Ky. CoNsT. § 231; LA. CONST. Art. III, § 35; NEB. CONST. Art. V,
§ 22; NEv. CONST. Art. IV, § 22; N.Y. CONsT. Art. VI, § 23; N.C. CONST. Art.
IV, § 9; N.D. CONST. Art. I, § 22; OHIo CONST. Art. I, § 16; ORE. CONST. Art.
IV, § 24; PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. Art. m, § 27; TENN. CONST. Art.
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ample, specifically says that "suits may be brought against the State
in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law
direct."'18 Yet the legislatures of a number of these states have insisted upon retaining control over determination of claims. Although
the Tennessee Constitution authorized the legislature to provide for
suit against the state, its legislature has expressly generally denied
the power to the courts. 14 Kentucky permits suits by prior special
legislative authorization as to each case. It has a general statute
covering all such cases to the effect that the jury is not to be apprized
of the resolution by the General Assembly authorizing the particular
lawsuit. 8 It has been held in South Carolina, to show a contrary
attitude, that a special act waiving immunity in a particular case violates the constitution of that state,' 6 and the constitution of Indiana
expressly provides against special legislation. 7
The constitutions of Idaho and North Carolina give original jurisdiction over claims against the state to the supreme court.'8 They do
not, however, provide a procedure, and none has been provided by
legislation. Nor are supreme courts constituted well to try cases;
they do not have juries, if a jury trial is in order. For that reason,
the procedure in those jurisdictions is generaly to commence suit in
the supreme court; after issue is joined ,the case is referred to a judge
of a trial court if there is a fact dispute. He makes findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and files them, along with a transcript of the
testimony, where so directed, in the supreme court. There the parties
are given opportunity for further argument.' 9
I, § 17; WAsH. CONST. Art. II, § 25; Wis. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 27; Wyo. CONST.
Art. I, § 8.
13. TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 17.
14. TEmt. CODE ANN. § 8634 (Williams 1934). Tennessee does have a Board
of Claims consisting of the Commissioner of Highways and Public Works,
Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, State Treasurer, Comptroller of the
Treasury, Secretary of State, Attorney General and Reporter. TEm. CODE
AmN. § 1034.26 (Williams Supp. 1952). The jurisdiction of the board, so far
as the purposes of this article are concerned, is generally limited to the handling of claims for damage or injury resulting from negligence in construction
and maintenance of state highways or operation of machinery or equipment
with relation to it. TENr. CODE AN. § 3252.1 (Williams 1934); Tenn. Acts
1951, c. 268, § 2A.
15. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.160 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1953).

16. Sirrine v. State, 132 S.C. 244, 128 S.E. 172 (1925).
17. INm. CONST. Art. IV, § 24.

18. IDAo CONST. Art. V, § 10; N.C. CONST. Art. IV, § 9. The Idaho Constitution also constitutes the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General
a board to examine claims (IDAHO CoNsT. Art. IV, § 18); and the administrative determination of a claim by this board is a prerequisite before the
supreme court will assume jurisdiction. Pyke v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho 614, 51
Pac. 614 (1897). North Carolina also now authorizes its Industrial Commission to consider tort claims not in excess of $8,000. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 143291-143-300 (1952).
19. "[Tjhe Supreme Court, as a rule, will consider only such claims as
present serious questions of law and will not take the burden of passing upon
'any and all claims that a party may prefer,'.., although in proper cases the
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Decisions under such constitutional provisions are advisory only.
They are reviewed by the legislature at its next session. The merit of
this procedure is that a claimant can at least obtain a determination
of his claim according to rules of law, and that it is generally improbable that the legislature will not make an appropriation in conformity with the coirt's decisions.
Legislative appropriation is necessary in any event, whether decision be my administrative body or by court and whether the determination be advisory or conclusive. 20 In no state is a judgment in a
tort or contract action a lien against the property of the government.
The judgment creditor may not levy execution. 21 Should the decision be by a court having power to enter judgment against the state,
it is collectible only as the legislature makes money available either
for the specific judgment or for the general purpose.
22
Some state constitutions forbid waiver of the state's immunity.
Illinois, as one of these states, displays an interesting anachronism.
Its constitution provides that the state "shall never be made defendant
in any court of law or equity." The legislature of that state, however,
created what it calls a court of claims. This is not a constitutional
court in the ordinary sense, but might be regarded as a legislative
or advisory court. It tries claims against the state, whether legal or
equitable, in tort or in contract, which the state, as a sovereign "should
in equity and good conscience, discharge and pay. '23 Because of the
court may order that issues of fact be tried in the Superior Court.... ." Cohoon
v. State, 201 N.C. 312, 160 S.E. 183 (1931).
In Bledsoe v. State, 64 N.C. 392 (1870), plaintiff, "director in the Lunatic
Asylum," entered into a contract with its superintendent to deliver pine wood
at $20 per cord in 1863. At the trial, he asked for $5 per cord in then current
currency. The supreme court was concerned about the prevailing value of
money. "Now at that time confederate money was twenty for one coin: if
therefore he had received confederate money according to his contract he
would have realized but one dollar in coin. Yet he charges five ... we recommend... interest from the end of the war. . . when the plaintiff presented

his claim to the General Assembly. And we do not recommend interest after

that time; because, if the plaintiff had presented a fair and reasonable claim,
we are to suppose that it would have been allowed. The subsequent delay
is by his own folly. And, for the same reason, we allow him no costs, but
order that he pay the costs of this suit." Id. at 394-98. Said the distinguished
court concerning its procedure, "We first referred the facts to the clerk, but
his report was unsatisfactory; and we then ordered issues to be tried in a

Superior Court by a jury, but we are not satisfied either with the rulings
of his Honor, or with the verdict of the jury. And, therefore, we state the
facts generally, as they appear to us ....
The clerk will be allowed $52' Ibid.
20. "It is a fundamental principle of our form of government that the Legislature, which is the appropriating branch, has sole power to authorize the
payment of claims against the Commonwealth." George A. Fuller Company
v. Commonwealth, 303 Mass. 216, 21 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1939). See Garcia v.
Bursom, 10 N.M. 43, 61 Pac. 207 (1900).
21. George A. Fuller Company v. Commonwealth, 303 Mass. 216, 21 N.E.2d
529 (1939).
22. ALA. CoNST. Art. I, § 14; ARK. CONST. Art. V, § 20; ILL. CONST. Art. IV,
§ 26; W. VA. CONST. Art. VI, § 35.
23. '"The court of claims is a statutory body not provided for in the con-
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restrictive language of the Illinois constitution, the decisions of the
court are advisory only; but the writer of this article has not been
able to learn of any case where the General Assembly of the state
has not followed the determinations of the court and paid according
to its recommendations. Under the court of claims law in Illinois it
is provided that any judge of the court may sit at any place within
the state to take evidence. No provision is made in the law for appeal.
Approximately one hundred cases are handled by the court each year.
The nature of the make-up of this Illinois court is such that other
types of work are submitted to it from time to time by the legislature.
Up to 1951, it had jurisdiction over claims of state government employees arising under the Workmen's Compensation and Occupational
Diseases acts. Since July of that year, these cases have been handled
by the Industrial Commission of Illinois. The 1953 legislature appropriated $150,000 to the court for the purpose of settling claims against
the state arising out of the activities of the Illinois Coal Products
Commission.
Administrative Handling of Claims
Hearing and determination of claims by legislative committees
sounds in politics and suggests a lack of protection to the people
according to rules of law. Progress in legislation in this field starts
with departures from the strictly legislative allowance of claims and
works toward the right to sue the state by the usual process. It moves
into recommendations to the legislature by an administrative arrangement and on toward final determination by the courts.
Some state constitutions provide an administrative procedure. By
the constitutions of Idaho,24 Montana, 25 Nevada, 26 and Utah,27 the
governor, secretary of state and attorney general constitute a board
of examiners to examine all such claims before they are submitted
to the legislature. The Nebraska constitution provides for administrative adjustment to be made by the state auditor and approved by the
secretary of state; but an aggrieved person may appeal from their
ruling to the district court.28 In the Michigan constitution, there is
a provision forbidding the legislature to audit or allow claims.29 That
constitution constitutes the secretary of state, state auditor and land
office commissioner a board for adjusting them. 0 The size of claims
stitution, and its action can have no effect upon the power of the legislature
to pay claims against the state." Fergus v. Russel, 277 Ill. 20, 115 N.E. 166,
167 (1917).
24. IDAHO CONST. Art. IV, § 18.
25. MONT. CONST. Art. VII, § 20.
26. NEV. CONST. Art. V,

27.
28.

§ 21.

UTAH CONST. Art. VII,
NEB. CONST. Art. VIII,

29. MICH. CONST.Art. V,

§ 13.
§ 9.

§ 34.

30. MICH. CONST.Art. VI,

§

20.
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to be submitted to the board has been limited by statute, however.
The Michigan legislature created a court of claims in 1939 and left
the constitutionally-constituted administrative board to handle only
smaller claims under $100.31 The judges of the court are regularly
constituted circuit judges designated by the presiding circuit judge
of the state. Appeal from its decisions is to the supreme court.
A recent Minnesota statute32 illustrates a first desirable move in
that state away from determination of claims solely by a legislative
committee. It permits suit against the state on an express contract,
but does not yet permit it in implied contract regardless of the otherwise legal or moral factors involved. 3 Then it establishes a state
claims commission of five members for hearing of tort claims. 3 The
commissioners are appointed by the legislature, and their terms expire at the close of the next legislature. The commission is to allow
only claims which but for its general immunity from suit could be
pressed against the state. There is no appeal from its decisions to
any court. Nor does the commission's award impose liability unless
the legislature has first made an appropriation subject to the commission's determination. Usual rules of evidence are not imposed,
and the commission is free to consider "any information that will
assist it in determining the factual basis of the claim." The statute
in Minnesota contains, as does the Federal Tort Claims Act, some
exceptions to the cases the commission may consider. One expects
these exceptions, even though not favorably impressed generally as
to their necessity.
Perhaps it would be as well that smaller claims be handled administratively by departments themselves with some precautions. This
is permitted without resort to even a commission under the Federal
Tort Claims Act as to claims not exceeding $1,000. $t In fact, money
had been available to some federal departments for some time prior
to that Act for administrative handling of smaller claims.80 The
Federal Government does have a large quantity of such small claims,
and it is realized that the importance of this method of handling small
31. Mcn. STAT. AwN. § 27.3548(8) (Supp. 1951). From its inception to January 7, 1954, the court had handled 474 cases. The larger portion of the claims
has involved the Highway Department, Department of Revenue, and the
Liquor Control Commission. The statute forbids more than one of the judges
to sit in Lansing, Michigan, at any time.
The defense of governmental function is abolished in Michigan in cases
involving negligent operation of state-owned motor vehicles. Id. § 27.3548 (14).
32. Mmn. STAT. ANN.§ 3.42 (West Supp. 1953).
33. See Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Liability of The Federal Government, 30 Mnm. L. REV. 133 (1946).
34. The committee is headed at this time by a former member of the claims
committee of Congress.
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2672 (1950).
36. E.g., Departments of the Army and of the Navy.
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claims is not so acute with states as in the national scheme of things.
Where this method would be pursued, standard forms would be used
for the purpose. Proof is largely by affidavit. This procedure reduces
petty litigation. It permits handling of a claim even by mail. It puts
responsibility on the department or agency involved to promote safety
and maintain good public relations, and it keeps the department or
agency informed as to the cost of its operations.
Whether claims are considered by commission or by the courts,
the added burden to the attorney general of the state is not to be
disregarded. Enlarging his services for the public protection is
hardly an evil, however. The Attorney General of the United States
was not deterred by it, and he actively encouraged Congress in its
adoption of the Tort Claims Act. Having to create a separate board
or commission or a separate court to hear claims does mean a substantial added expense to the state. These factors are usual for states
to consider. In any event, the United States has long had a Court of
Claims. 37 The concept of at least some court in which claims against
the government may be sued upon is not new.
Suits Against the States
Today suit is allowed rather generally with varying limitations
in eighteen states.38 Original jurisdiction is in the supreme court in
three of them.39 Three others have separate courts of claims. 40
A state court of claims was created in West Virginia in 1941 for
37. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1491 et seq. (1950).
38. ARm. CODE ANN. §§ 27-101 et seq. (1939) (on contract and tort); CAL.
GoVT. CODE §§ 16040-54 (1945) (on express contract and tort); CornN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7781, 8297 (1949) (for damage or injury from negligent operation
of state-owned vehicle); IDAHo CONST. Art. V, § 10 (original jurisdiction in
supreme court); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 37, §§ 439.9-439.23 (Supp. 1953) (suit in
court of claims on contract or tort, legal or equitable); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
4-1501-4-1507 (Burns Supp. 1953) (in superior court of Marion County sitting
as a court of claims on money demands arising in law or equity on express
or implied contracts); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 231, §§ 74-75, and c. 258, § 1-4A
(1933) (on all claims at law or in equity); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.2543 and
27.3548(8) (Supp. 1951) (in court of claims, in contract and tort); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 3.42 (West Supp. 1953) (in contract); Miss. CODE AxN. §§ 43874389 (1942) (on a liquidated claim which state auditor is empowered, but
refuses, to allow); NEB. CONST. Art. VIII, § 9 (all claims fitting into constitutional description, with those on contract, express or implied, sued in Lancaster County); N.Y. CONST. Art. VI, § 23, N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT (in
court of claims on contract, express or implied, or tort); N.C. CONST. Art.
IV, § 9 (in supreme court); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 32-1202-32-1204 (1943)
(respecting title to property or on contract); S.D. CODE § 33.0604 (1939)
(complaint filed in supreme court, referred to senior circuit judge in any
county sitting as commissioner of claims, on contract and tort); VA. CODE
§ 8-752 (1950) (on claims disallowed by comptroller); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.92-010 (1915) (in superior court of Thurston County on any claim); Wis.
STAT. § 285.01 (1949) (suit allowed after legislature denies claim).
39. IDAHO CONST. Art. V, § 10; N.C. CONST. Art. IV, § 9; S.D. CODE § 33.0604
(1939).
40. Illinois, Michigan and New York.
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consideration of both tort and contract cases. 41 In 1953, however, that
state back-tracked, and transferred the duties of the court to the
attorney general. 42 He holds hearings in his office in Charleston. He
takes testimony; affidavits may not be submitted as proof of any
claim. 43 The attorney general may lean over to be fair. The still im-

portant question remains whether the West Virginia procedure is
calculated to give confidence to the public that it will result in
justice to the claimant as well as the state. It is difficult to conceive
that the public will not question the integrity of a procedure wherein
the determination of a claimant's rights is to be made by the attorney
or agent of the government against which the claim is to be made.
New York, to the contrary, has strengthened its court of claims and
given to it an added deserved prestige. Historically, it had been
found that the legislative method of passing upon private claims had
led to abuses, more particularly with relation to construction projects. 44 The constitution of New York was accordingly amended in

1874 to forbid the legislature to audit any private claim. 45 The legislature thereupon constituted certain public officers as a Board of
Audit to perform the service.46 In 1883, that board was abolished and
the Board of Claims created in its stead. 47 In 1897, it was supplanted
by a "court of claims" with increased jurisdiction. 48 It became a
"board" again in 1911, 49 and revived as the "court" of claims in 1915.50

Thus its status from "board" to "court" and back to "board" again
occurred over the years as new political powers assumed control in
the legislature, the change being a means for a new administration
to oust the appointees of the old. 51 Efforts to make the court a genuinely judicial one bore fruit, however. In January of 1950, it was
52
made a constitutional court.

41. W. VA. CODEANN.

§ 1147 (8) (1949).

42. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1143-1147(21) (Supp. 1953).
43. Rules of Attorney General, pursuant to statute delegating to him the
function of hearing claims.
44. The Court of Claims of the State of New York ( a pamphlet argument
for constitutional provision for the court).
45. N.Y. CONST. Art. III, § 19.
46. N.Y. Laws 1876, c. 442.
47. N.Y. Laws 1883, c. 205.
48. N.Y. Laws 1897, c. 36.
49. N.Y. Laws 1911, c. 856.
50. N.Y. Laws 1915, c. 1 and c. 100.
51. "During a period of many years it has been the practice whenever a
change of administration has occurred to legislate out of office either the

Court of Claims or the Board of Claims, and to substitute therefor either a
Board of Claims or a Court of Claims, as the case might require. This practice has not been conducive in all cases to the best interests of the State.
Such practice should be impossible." Published letter of Nov. 23, 1921, from
Merton E. Lewis, former attorney general of New York.

52. N.Y. CONST. Art. VI, § 23. The constitutional provision is for a court
of six judges, with power in the legislature to increase the number. The court
is one of record. It appoints its own clerk. It has jurisdiction to hear and
determine "claims against the state or by the state against the claimant or
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An administrative board is sometimes provided which may entertain
the same claims which the courts themselves are given jurisdiction
to consider. It would usually be expected in such case that the board
would be a means for more summary handling of claims for the
worthwhile purpose of discouraging litigation. Where such an administrative agency is provided; the more acceptable procedure would
require a claimant to exhaust administrative processes before resorting to the courts.53
Court trial, in cases against the state, is generally by the court without a jury, as it is under the Federal Tort Claims Act, although this
is not universally so. 5 4 This clearly indicates some feeling that judges
are apt to be more conservative in their allowances than juries might
be. By like token, the precaution is perhaps in order, for the protection
of both the state and the state's attorney, that, if settlement is permissible under the statute, it should require court approval. 55
Rules as to venue, in cases other than those against the state, developed generally with relation to convenience of the parties and
witnesses and means of establishing proof. There is a temptation on
the part of legislatures to provide that the county in which the capitol
is situated shall be the forum for litigation against the state. If
personal appearance before a board or court is requisite to recovery,
this can be more burden to some claimants than consideration by a
legislative committee might be. Such a committee need not require
personal appearance. Smaller claims especially might never be
pressed if provision is not made for a convenient place and method
for proving them. The nature of the administrative body or court
to consider these claims is apt to affect the place for trial or hearing.
The Minnesota statute does provide that the regular meeting place
between conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide."

Even before this constitutional change, it was held that the court was one

of law and not just an auditing board. Provision for trial without a jury did
not deprive one of a constitutional right to jury trial for the reason given that
the claimant could have sued the state employee personally, if a tort action,
in the supreme court of New York. "[H] owever, he made his election to
pursue his remedy in the Court of Claims and is, therefore, bound by it."
Jones v. Young, 257 App. Div. 563, 14 N.Y.S.2d 84, 88 (3d Dep't 1939).

53. Under the California statutes, for instance, there is a State Board of

Control which has power to consider claims administratively. Suit against

the state may be had only after the board has disallowed the claim.

In Idaho, the supreme court decided, as a sound rule of administrative law
and of constitutional construction, not to consider claims until passed upon
by the Board of Examiners. Pyke v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho 614, 51 Pac. 614
(1897).
54. Kentucky legislature waives immunity by special acts, but has a
general rule covering all such cases restricting information to be made available to the juries. Ky. Laws 1948, c. 167.
The United States Court of Claims proceeds without a jury and this may
constitute a considered precedent in most states that waive imnunity.
55. This procedure is incorporated in FTCA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2677 (1950).
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of the claims commission shall be at the state capitol.5 6 But that statute
also provides that the commission, its size notwithstanding, may hold
meetings at any county seat. Similarly, the courts of claims in Illinois
and Michigan have provided by rule for holding sessions elsewhere
than at the capitol. In the jurisdictions where suits are commenced
in the supreme courts, they can be referred for trial at places which
convenience for the claimant as well as the government may dictate.
Where an already-existing trial court is to try the claim, this problem
need not exist.
Venue, if suit is in a trial court, should probably be in the district
where the plaintiff lives or the cause of action arises or in the county
of the capitol, subject to change of venue in conformity with usual
rules. That does suggest expense to the public in moving members
of attorney general offices about the state to try cases. That is, unless
state's attorneys in the various counties are under some direction
from the state attorney general and responsible to him to handle
civil as well as criminal litigation. One can only look to what ought
to be as answer to this problem where it may arise, and recognize
the iecessity of better state legal department organization in an
increasingly organized society.
Conclusion-Recommendations
There is nothing in the absence of constitutional provision, that
could legally preclude the legislature from considering claims which
some persons might not choose to present to a commission or court; or
from allowing such claims even though the administrative body or
the court might first deny it. One of the purposes of providing for
administrative or court determination, though, is to relieve legislatures from these generally private problems so that they can tend
to broader problems of government. The better view, then, would
be that the statute should contain a self-disciplinary provision precluding consideration of any such claims by the legislature except
as it may provide for payment of them.r Appeals by the state or
by claimants whose claims have been rejected should be only to a
judicial body. From a trial court, appeal should be only to the highest
court of the state. If the decision is made by a board or commission,
that administrative body should have the benefit of a correct determination according to rules of law if it is in error; and appeal from that
body should not be allowed to go on to what so many regard as a
political, in contradistinction to a judicial, body.58 The legislature
moN. STAT. ANx. § 3.47 (West Supp. 1953).
57. Congress made a similar provision with respect to FTCA. 60 STAT. c.
753, § 131 (1946).
58. Minnesota, to the contrary, provides: "A determination by the commis56.
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will certainly choose to watch the handling of claims and satisfy
itself that the system of court determination is such as commands
its confidence. Essentially, however, its function should be to appropriate for determinations made according to rules of law just as
any private person who is a judgment debtor finds it necessary to do.
In a larger sense, we are concerned here with the desirability of
removing an immunity or veil behind which government in the
United States has been prone to hide but which has no logical place
in a democracy. 9 There is no sound reason why the activities of
government should not be conducted according to the same standards
of morality or fair dealing to which private persons are expected
to conform. Protection to injured persons against negligent or perverse governmental conduct should be a matter of right. As for the
field of contracts, government, having given its word and expecting
to bind the contracting party, cannot with grace complain that the
contractor seeks to enforce that very promise against the government
in court. Our concern in any controversy between the state and a
private person should be, not with what the power of the respective
litigating parties may be, but with who is right. If one will accept
this as the correct approach, then it makes no difference whether the
government involved is that of the United States or of an individual
state or whether the defendant is the government or a private person.
This problem is not so important when the functions of government are few. But as those functions increase in the scheme of social
and economic development, protections to the public may well be
overlooked. Thus, now we simply look back for what has lagged
behind the progress although pretty much created by it; and we
tuck in the tag ends.
The writer suggests that the day has come for all government,
whether national or state, to waive its immunity from suit against
it in tort or in contract, whether express or implied, in law or equity.
sion is not subject to appeal to, or review by any court ....
"'MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 3.44 (West Supp. 1953).

59. "It is certainly not in accord with American democracy to permit the
state to take private property by other than legal means and then to defend
itself by a plea of nonsuability." Benson v. Bentley, 216 Mlinn. 146, 160, 12
N.W.2d 347, 355 (1943).

